CVE-2012-0003 Microsoft Windows Media Player ‘winmm.dll’ MIDI文件解析远程代码执行漏洞 分析

　　　[CNNVD]Microsoft Windows Media Player ‘winmm.dll’ MIDI文件解析远程代码执行漏洞(CNNVD-201201-110)

　　   Microsoft Windows是微软发布的非常流行的操作系统。Windows Media Player是系统的多媒体播放组件。
        WMP在处理畸形结构的MIDI数据时存在内存破坏漏洞。远程攻击者可利用该漏洞通过诱使用户访问恶意网页控制用户系统。

　　注意这个漏洞是ie进程在调用多媒体的dll时触发的，也就是要去挂载ie进程。加载poc后数秒内ie进程crash，异常信息如下：

(aa0.aa4): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=002261c4 ebx= ecx=0c0c0c0c edx=0000003d esi=00225dc8 edi=0039d910
eip=7e390581 esp=0012e198 ebp=0012e1a8 iopl=         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b  ss=  ds=  es=  fs=003b  gs=             efl=
mshtml!CAttrValue::GetIntoVariant+0x4d:
7e390581 ff5104          call    dword ptr [ecx+]    ds::0c0c0c10=????????

由于是ie的漏洞我们对这种call [ecx+4]的形式比较敏感（因为ie存在大量的对象虚表访问），来具体看一下，ub mshtml!CAttrValue::GetIntoVariant+0x4d，如下

:> ub mshtml!CAttrValue::GetIntoVariant+0x4d
mshtml!CAttrValue::GetIntoVariant+0x3a:
7e39056e e8f93ef0ff      call    mshtml!VariantCopy (7e29446c)
7e390573 8bd8            mov     ebx,eax
7e390575 eb35            jmp     mshtml!CAttrValue::GetIntoVariant+0x78 (7e3905ac)
7e390577 8b460c          mov     eax,dword ptr [esi+0Ch]
7e39057a 3bc3            cmp     eax,ebx
7e39057c             je      mshtml!CAttrValue::GetIntoVariant+0x50 (7e390584)
7e39057e 8b08            mov     ecx,dword ptr [eax]
7e390580               push    eax

我们一看就知道这个就是虚表访问，这个套路在ie里真是见过太多了，eax是对象指针，ecx是虚表指针，那么call [ecx+4]就是调用虚函数了。我们继续看下这个对象中的内容

:> dc eax
002261c4  0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c 0c0c0c0c   ................
002261d4       ................
002261e4       ................
002261f4  06f72ed0  002dc72b   ........+.-.....
  002265f4  002dc72c   .e".....,.-.....
00226214  06f59bb0 00000902 002dc72d 00000000  ........-.-.....
00226224  09318a68 00000b02 002dc72e 00000000  h.1.......-.....
00226234  0000ffff 00000302 002dc72f 00000000  ......../.-.....

喜闻乐见的堆喷，看来作者的思路就是伪造一个对象的虚表为0c0c0c0c，然后堆喷到0c0c0c0c伪造虚函数布置shellcode，这也是很常规的做法，那为啥会crash呢？我们来看一下，

:> dd 0c0c0c0c
0c0c0c0c  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0c0c0c1c  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0c0c0c2c  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0c0c0c3c  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0c0c0c4c  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0c0c0c5c  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0c0c0c6c  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
0c0c0c7c  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
:> !address 0c0c0c0c
    0ac0c000 : 0ac0c000 - 053f4000
                    Type
                    Protect   PAGE_NOACCESS
                    State     MEM_FREE
                    Usage    RegionUsageFree

显示这块内存未分配，看来并没能喷到0c0c0c0c，估计作者是翻车了，或者是我的环境有问题。那么我们再去找找作者用哪里的漏洞搞的大新闻。

首先要开hpa了，因为我们已知是堆漏洞了。断在如下位置

(eec.b40): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax= ebx=0000007d ecx=007db29f edx= esi=126ef019 edi=126b6f60
eip=76b2d224 esp=12dffe80 ebp=12dffea0 iopl=         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=001b  ss=  ds=  es=  fs=003b  gs=             efl=
WINMM!midiOutPlayNextPolyEvent+0x1ec:
76b2d224 8a06            mov     al,byte ptr [esi]          ds::126ef019=??

我们不知道esi是什么地址，但是我们可以猜一下，!heap -p -a esi ，结果如下果真是页堆的导致的异常。我们计算一下：126eec00+0x400=126EF000 ，而126ef019>126ef000。又我们可以知道堆只有分配的记录并没有释放的记录说明肯定不是UAF漏洞了，那么肯定是堆溢出或是基于堆的数组访问越界了。

v0:> !heap -p -a esi
    address 126ef019 found in
    _DPH_HEAP_ROOT @
    in busy allocation (  DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:         UserAddr         UserSize -         VirtAddr         VirtSize)
                                11fc4058:         126eec00               -         126ee000
    7c938f01 ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x00000e64
    76b2b2b3 WINMM!winmmAlloc+0x00000016
    76b2cdee WINMM!mseOpen+0x00000044
    76b2d97e WINMM!mseMessage+0x00000029
    76b2a17f WINMM!midiStreamOpen+0x00000207
    77ba1f7c midimap!modOpen+0x000000f8
    77ba29f3 midimap!modMessage+0x0000005e
    76b2a15e WINMM!midiStreamOpen+0x000001e6
    7d03567d quartz!CMidiOutDevice::DoOpen+0x00000026
    7d035727 quartz!CMidiOutDevice::amsndOutOpen+0x00000059
    7cfabc7a quartz!CWaveOutFilter::amsndOutOpen+0x0000002e
    7cfabc05 quartz!CWaveOutFilter::DoOpenWaveDevice+0x0000007a
    7cfabe12 quartz!CWaveOutFilter::OpenWaveDevice+0x00000019
    7cfabcda quartz!CWaveOutFilter::Pause+0x00000049
    7cf8cf61 quartz!CFilterGraph::Pause+0x00000107

重新运行程序，对WINMM!midiOutPlayNextPolyEvent+0x1ec下断，看下回溯

:> kp
ChildEBP RetAddr
1243fea0 76b2d2e5 WINMM!midiOutPlayNextPolyEvent+0x1ec
1243feb4 76b154e3 WINMM!midiOutTimerTick+0x4f
1243fedc 76b2adfe WINMM!DriverCallback+0x5c
1243ff18 76b2af02 WINMM!TimerCompletion+0xf4
1243ffb4 7c80b729 WINMM!timeThread+0x53
1243ffec  kernel32!BaseThreadStart+0x37

看下在哪个模块中，如下，抓出来用IDA打开

:> lmm winmm v
start    end        module name
76b10000 76b3a000   WINMM      (pdb symbols)          C:\symbols\winmm.pdb\90FC96D5AD8440A2B14855895BD92ED62\winmm.pdb
    Loaded symbol image file: C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll
    Image path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll
    Image name: WINMM.dll
    Timestamp:        Mon Apr  ::  (4802BDE1)
    CheckSum:         0002C65D
    ImageSize:        0002A000
    File version:     ...
    Product version:  ...
    File flags:        (Mask 3F)
    File OS:           NT Win32
    File type:        . Dll
    File date:        .
    Translations:     .04b0
    CompanyName:      Microsoft Corporation
    ProductName:      Microsoft(R) Windows(R) Operating System
    InternalName:     winmm.dll
    OriginalFilename: WINMM.DLL
    ProductVersion:   ...
    FileVersion:      ... (xpsp.-)
    FileDescription:  MCI API DLL
    LegalCopyright:   (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.